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INTRODUCTION 
I own municipal bonds: Lowell, Massachusetts general obligation 
bonds; New York Metropolitan Transit Authority Bonds; revenue 
bonds issued by the Philadelphia Water and Wastewater Authority; 
some bonds issued by the city of Virginia Beach.  I also live in the city 
of Charlottesville, Virginia, own a home and pay property and other 
local taxes there. 
As a bondholder, do I pay attention to Lowell’s, Philadelphia’s or 
New York City’s fiscal behavior?  Do I know what these cities and 
public authorities are doing with my money?  Could I tell you wheth-
er those bond issuers are good, bad, or indifferent managers? 
Similarly, as a resident and citizen of Charlottesville, do I pay at-
tention to the city’s fiscal behavior?  Do I have any idea what Char-
lottesville’s budget is?  (I do, but only because I teach local govern-
ment law.)  Could I tell you whether the city is a good, bad or 
indifferent manager? 
In both these roles—as a bondholder and as a citizen—my incen-
tive and capacity to monitor local government is limited.  It is not 
nonexistent, but it is quite crude.  Assuming that is true, what are the 
institutional mechanisms that encourage local governments to keep 
 
∗ Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.  This Essay is expanded 
from remarks presented at the Cooper-Walsh Colloquium, “Big Problems, Small 
Government: Assessing the Recent Financial Crisis’ Impact on Municipalities,” held 
at the Fordham Law School on November 11, 2011.  Thanks to Clayton Gillette for 
providing the excellent paper to which this Essay is a response, to the organizers and 
participants for a stimulating conference, and to Risa Goluboff for reading prior 
drafts. 
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their fiscal houses in order?  Moreover, in these times of fiscal dis-
tress, what are the implications of favoring bondholders or citizens 
when local governments come under fiscal stress and cannot pay their 
bills?  Who should bear the risk of a default—citizens through tax 
hikes or bondholders through losses?  And can the appropriate allo-
cation of priority at the default stage help to prevent local fiscal dis-
tress in the first place? 
These are centrally important questions as cities and other local au-
thorities experience financial crises in the aftermath of the recent 
economic recession.1  These are also the questions that Professor 
Clayton Gillette asks in his contribution to this Colloquium.2  Gillette 
ultimately concludes that bondholders are in a better position to mon-
itor the fiscal health of local governments and should thus be charged 
with the risk of default when financial trouble comes along.3  He fur-
ther argues that by placing the risk on bondholders, the chances of lo-
cal fiscal distress will be reduced.4 
I am somewhat less sanguine.  I agree with Gillette that bondhold-
ers should be charged with the risk of municipal default, though my 
reasons are slightly different than his.  I am also less sure than he is 
that such an allocation of risk will serve to prevent fiscal crises ex 
ante.  And, unlike Gillette, I think that some judicial ambiguity as to 
the allocation of risk is not a bad thing. 
In fact, Gillette’s article has convinced me that neither bondholders 
nor citizens are particularly good monitors of local fiscal probity.  If 
this is true, then it presents a puzzle.  As Gillette observes, municipal-
ities have significantly lower default rates than do their private-side 
counterparts.5  Why do cities have such low default rates?  Why do 
they generally keep their fiscal houses in good order? 
Gillette’s article raises a second puzzle as well.  He observes that 
nineteenth century state courts and state legislatures were relatively 
sympathetic to cities and their citizens, often invalidating creditors’ 
claims and placing losses at the feet of bondholders.6  Twenty-first 
century state courts and legislatures have yet to make their sympa-
thies fully known, but the assumption that bondholders must be paid 
 
 1. See, e.g., Monica Davey, Darker Nights as Some Cities Turn Off Lights for 
the Savings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2011, at A11. 
 2. Clayton Gillette, Bondholders and Financially Stressed Municipalities, 39 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639 [hereinafter Gillette, Bondholders]. 
 3. Id. at 677. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 665–66. 
 6. Id. at 642–43.  The United States Supreme Court was less so. Id. at 644. 
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seems to dominate discussion of local fiscal crises.  This raises the fol-
lowing question: why were state courts and state legislatures relatively 
sympathetic to cities and citizens in the nineteenth century and why 
do public officials appear to be much less sympathetic to cities and 
citizens now? 
Part I addresses the question of municipal monitoring, arguing 
(though for different reasons than Gillette) that bondholders are the 
appropriate bearers of the risk of municipal default.  Part II explains 
why this allocation of risk is unlikely to have any significant ex ante 
effects on local fiscal discipline.  Indeed, I have argued elsewhere and 
argue here that “fiscal discipline” is not the central problem for local 
governments; their fiscal woes originate elsewhere.7  Part III then ad-
dresses the two puzzles raised by Gillette’s article.  I suggest reasons 
unrelated to creditor or citizen monitoring for why local governments 
generally do not default.  I then argue that the currently fashionable 
functional arguments for paying off creditors are not particularly con-
vincing and that the choice between citizens and bondholders is ulti-
mately a political one. 
I.  MONITORING AND RISK BEARING 
Gillette’s argument is straightforward: legal rules allocating the risk 
of default as between bondholders and citizens should make the 
choice that will induce the party that is better able to monitor local 
fiscal conditions to undertake that monitoring.8  Bondholders are bet-
ter positioned to monitor local fiscal decisions, either through the 
bond issuance process or by demanding ex ante compensation in the 
form of higher interest rates.9  Therefore, when a default occurs and 
courts must make a decision about who gets paid (and how much), 
judges should favor citizens over bondholders.10  In practical terms, 
courts should be more willing to impose losses on bondholders than 
to demand that a defaulting city raise taxes or decrease services.11 
 
 7. Richard C. Schragger, Democracy and Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 860, 885 (2012). 
 8. Gillette, Bondholders, supra note 2, at 657. 
 9. Id. at 656. 
 10. See id. at 677. 
 11. Id. at 641 n.21. But cf. Clayton Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and 
Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (2012) [hereinafter 
Gillette, Political Will].  In Political Will, Gillette argues that bankruptcy courts 
should order local governments to impose tax increases to pay off creditors. Id. at 53.  
He claims that municipalities will otherwise use bankruptcy strategically to renege on 
debts and that such a strategic use of bankruptcy generates negative externalities. Id. 
at 41–46.  Gillette’s argument in Political Will is in some tension with his claim that 
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I share Gillette’s view that bondholders should bear the risk of de-
fault, but I am not certain that it is because they are better monitors 
ex ante.  Indeed, problems of monitoring bedevil both citizens and 
bondholders. 
As Gillette points out, citizen monitoring is difficult because citizen 
preferences are heterogeneous and the burdens and benefits of local 
policies are unequally distributed.  The central problem is that there 
is no consensus on what a citizen should be monitoring for.12  Because 
a city is not a profit-making enterprise, its performance cannot be 
measured by a specific financial return.  Moreover, citizen prefer-
ences depend significantly on citizens’ time horizons.  It may not be in 
the interest of present citizens to monitor in ways that are beneficial 
to future citizens.  Current debt spending, for instance, might be sup-
ported by current residents even if future residents would oppose it. 
The free rider problems that Gillette points out are also difficult to 
surmount; any one citizen has little incentive, little expertise, and lit-
tle time to monitor local fiscal health.  This problem is exacerbated by 
the mobility of the American populace; local citizens are unlikely to 
monitor the long-term fiscal stability of a local government if they are 
not going to be there very long.13  And finally, monitoring of local fis-
cal health is of limited usefulness when the economic health of any 
particular locality is dependent upon wider regional or national econ-
omies.  Citizen monitoring of local fiscal behavior will be ineffective if 
local fiscal health is driven by developments that are beyond the local 
government’s control. 
Of course, citizens have an interest in ensuring that local officials 
are not running the municipality into the ground.  If that interest can 
be leveraged and free rider problems can be overcome, then monitor-
ing might be possible.  William Fischel has theorized that homeown-
 
citizens should be favored over bondholders as a way of enhancing monitoring.  Fur-
ther, his claim that municipalities will act strategically is mostly anecdotal.  Municipal 
bankruptcies are quite rare.  Kevin Kordana has argued that municipalities are un-
likely to act strategically and observes that municipalities make every effort to pay 
their debts despite the lack of formal sanctions for default. See Kevin Kordana, Tax 
Increases in Municipal Bankruptcy, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035, 1074–75 (1997).  Moreover, 
the bond market seems unconcerned with strategic defaults, as municipalities contin-
ue to be able to borrow at relatively low rates. Id. at 1075.  If strategic defaults were a 
real concern, we would arguably see many more municipal bankruptcies and much 
less lending to municipalities. Id. at 1077. 
 12. Gillette, Bondholders, supra note 2, at 659. 
 13. Indeed, in Tiebout’s theory, local citizens will not actively monitor at all.  In-
stead, they will simply vote with their feet. See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of 
Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956). 
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ers in smaller jurisdictions can assess the performance of their gov-
ernment by treating their home values as a barometer of fiscal health.  
If local government performance is capitalized into home values, then 
“homevoters” can easily vote their interest in the stability of their 
property values.14  If the value of residents’ homes increase, the city is 
doing well; if those home values decrease, the city is doing poorly. 
The difficulty is that while homeowners undoubtedly have a strong 
interest in maintaining the value of their homes, home values turn out 
to be a fairly inaccurate (and even misleading) barometer of local fis-
cal health.  The recent housing bust provides some evidence that 
house values often have little to do with economic fundamentals.15  It 
certainly provides evidence that house values often have little to do 
with any particular local government’s fiscal policies.  Local house 
values are often a result of factors outside the immediate control of 
local governments.16 
Moreover, homeowner-based monitoring can be pernicious.  
Fischel’s homevoters might be eager to adopt policies that improve 
home values in the short term while sacrificing long-term fiscal stabil-
ity, particularly in boom times.  Indeed, one could argue that it was a 
nation of homevoters writ large that exacerbated local fiscal crises by 
demanding policies that artificially inflated house prices.17 
Gillette argues that bondholders are better positioned to assess lo-
cal fiscal health. Individual holders of bonds are not likely to monitor; 
the free rider and information problems are likely insurmountable.  
But Gillette claims that even if the owner of a single municipal bond 
is not equipped to monitor, institutional gatekeepers like banks, cred-
it ratings agencies, insurers, underwriters, and large investors general-
ly have the incentive and capacity to keep an eye on local invest-
ments.18 
 
 14. WILLIAM FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES IN-
FLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLI-
CIES 4 (2001). 
 15. See, e.g., Brent Ambrose et al., House Prices and Fundamentals: 355 Years of 
Evidence (Jan. 12, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Burnside et 
al., Understanding Booms and Busts in Housing Markets (Jan. 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
 16. Jan K. Brueckner et al., Subprime Mortgages and the Housing Bubble, 71 J. 
URB. ECON. 230, 230 (2012). 
 17. See, e.g., Viewpoints: The Mortgage Interest Deduction, HUD.GOV, http:// 
www.huduser.org/portal/periodicals/em/spring11/highlight4.html (last visited Feb. 2, 
2012).  
 18. Gillette, Bondholders, supra note 2, at 670–76.  
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Gillette’s assessment is replete with caveats, however.19  He recog-
nizes the obvious limitations of ratings agencies and other market ac-
tors and observes that the interests of bond market makers are not 
always benign.20  Market makers are interested in selling debt and will 
take advantage of both issuers and buyers, selling products of dubious 
quality to both sides—“trafficking in the shame of the cities.”21  And 
investors often make mistakes, underestimating the risk of exogenous 
shocks and overestimating the probability of repayment during flush 
times.  Moreover, while the price of municipal debt may reflect the 
underlying credit-worthiness of the entity issuing the debt, it also re-
flects the comparative attractiveness of other kinds of investments.  
The market may be full of lemons.  Gillette is going to have a great 
deal of difficulty persuading readers who experienced the recent re-
cession—caused in large part by mispriced debt—that institutional 
actors will serve as responsible gatekeepers. 
But even if bondholders could monitor, why would they do so 
when they can diversify instead?22  Monitoring is costly.  Diversifica-
tion reduces those costs.  If bondholders act as prudent investors, they 
will assume some failure rate and build that into the range of their in-
vestments.  And they can buy and sell their debt readily.  Citizens are 
differently situated.  They cannot diversify to any real degree.  Their 
home is often their biggest asset and it is located in one jurisdiction.  
This inability to diversify is the central difference between citizens 
and bondholders. The gap between them is not their respective capac-
ities to monitor, but their respective capacities to bear risk.  Citizens 
cannot readily hedge against downside risk; bondholders can.23  
Kevin Kordana makes this point in an important article arguing 
that bankruptcy courts should approve reorganization plans that do 
not impose tax increases on citizens but do impose some loss on 
bondholders.24  Bondholders are more appropriate risk bearers, he 
argues, not because they are better monitors of local fiscal health, but 
 
 19. Id. at 664–70. 
 20. Id. at 671, 675. 
 21. Id. at 675 (quoting A. M. HILLHOUSE, MUNICIPAL BONDS 254–55 (1936)). 
 22. Gillette recognizes this in his colloquium contribution, see Gillette, Bond-
holders, supra note 2, at 665, and elsewhere, see Clayton Gillette, Can Public Debt 
Enhance Democracy?, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 937, 979–80 (2008) [hereinafter Gil-
lette, Public Debt].  Nevertheless, he seems to discount it.    
 23. Lee Anne Fennell has written at length about this problem, and has suggested 
mechanisms to solve it. See Lee Anne Fennell, Controlling Residential Stakes, 77 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 143, 153–65 (2010). 
 24. Kordana, supra note 11, at 1039. 
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because they have been paid ex ante to assume the risk.25  He further 
argues that imposing the costs of default on citizens is inappropriate 
and inefficient.  As Kordana observes, it makes little sense to charge 
current residents for commitments that past residents may have un-
dertaken.26  He notes that local residents change over time and thus 
there is little relationship between risk-creators and risk-bearers.27  
He further argues that raising taxes can be inefficient, as it may in-
duce taxpayer flight and undermine the municipality’s ability to re-
cover from fiscal distress.28  Finally, Kordana asserts that bondholders 
are better positioned to absorb economic shocks by pricing those 
eventualities into the interest rate they charge.29  The interest rate and 
diversification are the appropriate ways for creditors to protect 
against financial loss.30  There are no equivalent mechanisms for citi-
zens.  For that reason, it makes little sense to charge residents of fis-
cally strapped cities in order to pay off bondholders. 
II.  PREVENTING LOCAL FISCAL DISTRESS 
I do not think that Professor Gillette would quarrel with the basic 
thrust of this argument.31  Gillette, however, makes an additional 
claim.  He argues that assigning the risk of default to bondholders will 
help prevent local economic distress in the first place.32  Bondholders 
will protect their investments by putting pressure on local govern-
ments to act more responsibly.33  And local governments will respond, 
in part because their borrowing costs will increase if they do not.34  
The debt markets will provide fiscal discipline. 
This view assumes Gillette’s assertion that bondholders be willing 
and able to monitor effectively—a questionable claim, as I have ar-
gued.  It also requires that bondholders be able to translate their con-
cerns into political pressure and that local officials have the will and 
capacity to respond to that pressure. 
 
 25. See id. at 1097–99. 
 26. Id. at 1101. 
 27. Id. at 1101–02. 
 28. Id. at 1102–04. 
 29. Id. at 1100–01.  
 30. Id. at 1099–1101. 
 31. But cf. Gillette, Political Will, supra note 11, at 53 (advocating compelled tax 
increases in bankruptcy). 
 32. Gillette, Bondholders, supra note 2, at 677.  
 33. See also Gillette, Public Debt, supra note 22, at 985 (making a similar argu-
ment). 
 34. Id. at 984–85. 
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Certainly the bond markets, via the ratings agencies, can pressure 
governments to address their debt problems—though ratings down-
grades seem to occur well after governments are already in fiscal 
trouble.35  If lenders are willing to lend even to dubious projects (as 
they seem to be willing to do during economic booms), the market is 
not going to exert much of a disciplining force. 
Moreover, public officials have to be willing and able to respond to 
the market’s negative signals.  It is true that as borrowing costs in-
crease, taxpayers may have to pay more, leading them to protest.  But 
borrowing costs depend on a host of factors that may have little to do 
with current officials’ mismanagement.  The connection between offi-
cials’ actions and creditor concerns can be quite tenuous, even 
opaque to voters.36  And because increases in borrowing costs are dis-
tributed among large populations of taxpayers and paid over many 
years, the marginal increased cost to any one taxpayer is unlikely to 
excite sustained political attention. 
More importantly, as Gillette recognizes, the interests of citizens 
and creditors will not always or even usually overlap.  If local officials 
are appropriately responsive to local voters, they will ignore creditor 
demands that are inconsistent with those interests.  It is also possible 
that local officials will be too responsive to the demands of the bond 
market, thus disserving the local electorate.  Either way, there is sig-
nificant misalignment between creditor preferences and appropriate 
political action.  Indeed, because citizens will have varied preferences, 
what constitutes appropriate political action will always be contested.  
Relying on the narrow interests of creditors to serve as a proxy for 
the local common good is highly problematic. 
Finally, even if local public officials want to respond to creditor 
demands, they might not be able to do so.  The view that bondholders 
can monitor for good local fiscal outcomes assumes that local gov-
ernments assert substantial control over their economic and fiscal 
fates.  But there are good reasons to be skeptical about this assump-
tion.  First, local governments have little control over large-scale 
boom and bust cycles, which are a feature of modern economies.  In-
 
 35. Consider that Greece, which has essentially defaulted, was selling debt with 
only a modestly higher interest rate than its peer nations just two years ago, and that 
ratings agencies did not downgrade Greek debt until relatively recently.  See Julie 
Creswell & Graham Bowley, Ratings Firms Misread Signs of Greek Woes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2011, at A1.  Gillette notes how ratings agencies failed to anticipate 
New York’s financial crisis in the 1970s. See Gillette, Bondholders, supra note 2, at 
672–73. 
 36. Schragger, supra note 7, at 874–75. 
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deed, state laws restricting debt, mandating balanced budgets, and 
limiting taxes and expenditures tend to exacerbate economic down-
turns because they prevent states and localities from engaging in 
countercyclical spending.37  Second, local governments are compelled 
by state mandates to provide certain services.  Unlike firms, cities 
cannot restructure those basic obligations.  They cannot get out of the 
business of providing schools and minimum levels of health care and 
welfare services to their constituents.  Third, there are often structural 
reasons for local fiscal failure, including the loss of a large job-
creating industry or the precipitous decline in property values 
brought about by events beyond the localities’ control.  In the United 
States, formerly robust industrial cities are facing fiscal failure not 
primarily because of mismanagement (though there has been some) 
but because deindustrialization, suburbanization, and globalization 
have sidelined their once prosperous economies. 
I do not mean to argue that mismanagement never occurs or that a 
mature bond market can never distinguish between good and bad 
debt during normal economic times.  A well-functioning municipal 
bond market can and does influence government borrowers, for bet-
ter and for worse.38  Nevertheless, the bond market’s influence is un-
likely to change city outcomes in significant ways. 
If mismanagement is a concern, however, then maybe the legal 
rules should differentiate between different kinds of fiscal distress.  In 
the nineteenth century (and sometimes the twentieth) state courts of-
ten denied creditors relief by invalidating municipal bonds for large-
scale infrastructure projects that failed.39  Courts seemed to be elimi-
nating venal deals ex post, often responding to popular outrage over 
the commitment of public monies to oversold private schemes.40  As 
Gillette points out, there are many ways to muddy the Constitution’s 
Contract Clause and state constitutional equivalents, which otherwise 
seem to require that municipal debtors meet their commitments to 
 
 37. Id. at 872–73. 
 38. For example, John Yinger has argued that municipal bond ratings can act as a 
form of redlining.  He provides evidence that ratings agencies practice discrimination 
against places with a certain racial or ethnic composition. See John Yinger, Municipal 
Bond Ratings and Citizens’ Rights, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 3, 6–8 (2009). 
 39. See ERIC H. MONKKONEN, THE LOCAL STATE: PUBLIC MONEY AND 
AMERICAN CITIES 22 (1995).  For additional citations, see Gillette, Bondholders, su-
pra note 2, at 640–53. 
 40. MONKKONEN, supra note 39, at 72–77; Gillette, Bondholders, supra note 2, at 
5.  
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their creditors.41  Even while asserting the sanctity of creditor con-
tracts, modern-day courts have introduced significant ambiguity into 
the question of when and how a bondholder must get paid.42  Gillette 
is somewhat dismayed at this ambiguity.  He would prefer clear rules, 
even if they disfavor bondholders.43 
But ambiguity has its virtues.  By invalidating certain debt offerings 
in the nineteenth century, courts were telling bondholders that they 
would not be allowed to take advantage of municipal borrowers and 
drain municipal coffers.  Perhaps nineteenth century courts also rec-
ognized that municipalities were less mismanaged than unlucky.  The 
economic crises of the nineteenth century precipitated failures 
throughout the country.44  Saddling citizens with non-dischargeable 
debt and forcing them to raise taxes to pay off bondholders—who 
had often taken advantage of relatively opaque municipal political 
processes—was both unjust and inappropriate.  It also could create 
incentives for lenders to over-lend. 
The same could be said today.  Some ambiguity in the rules of pri-
ority allows courts to distinguish between bad luck and bad manage-
ment, giving government debtors some way to restructure their debts 
during economic cycles over which they have little control—when 
they are mistaken but not corrupt or incompetent.  The uncertainty 
also requires market makers, insurers, and investors to take responsi-
bility for venal deals.45  At the same time, it allows the court to charge 
the debtor city when it appears that it is acting strategically, or when 
its citizens are in a position to afford to pay off the debt. 
III.  WHY THE PREFERENCE FOR BONDHOLDERS? 
At the end of the day, creditors have limited formal remedies in the 
face of municipal defaults.  Gillette notes that certain states give pri-
ority to bondholders and mandate payments out of segregated 
 
 41. Gillette, Bondholders, supra note 2, at 640–53. 
 42. See id. at 653–54. 
 43. Id. at 654–55. 
 44. See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 817 (7th ed. 2009). 
 45. Consider that Jefferson County, Alabama’s recent bankruptcy filing has pre-
cipitated a lawsuit against the County’s lead underwriter, JP Morgan, on the grounds 
that it misled the County and investors. See Mary Williams Walsh, Bankruptcy Filing 
Raises Doubts About a Bond Repayment Pledge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2011, at B1.  
Indeed, as Gillette points out, the Securities and Exchange Commission entered into 
a settlement with the underwriter in 2009, requiring it to pay significant penalties. See 
Gillette, Bondholders, supra note 2, at 44 n.160. 
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funds.46  But it is difficult—if not impossible—for creditors to seize 
municipal property or compel tax increases.47  Nevertheless, creditors 
still lend to municipalities and municipal borrowers still make con-
certed efforts to repay.  Municipal borrowers’ historical default rates 
are remarkably low compared to their private-side counterparts.48  
Absent extreme economic circumstances, relatively few cities go 
bankrupt. 
The relative fiscal probity of local governments raises a conceptual 
puzzle.  If neither bondholders nor citizens are very good monitors of 
local fiscal health, what accounts for the low rate of defaults among 
municipalities?  There is also an historical puzzle.  In the face of sig-
nificant numbers of municipal defaults in the nineteenth century, 
state courts often invalidated bondholder claims.49  During the pre-
sent economic crisis, when only a handful of cities have defaulted, the 
rhetoric (if not practice) of bondholder inviolability seems much 
more robust.  Why? 
Neither puzzle can be answered at length here, but I can venture 
some hypotheses.  As to the puzzle of low defaults, it may simply be 
that governments, unlike firms, do not raise revenue primarily 
through the sales of goods and services, but rather through the collec-
tion of taxes.  In a society in which the public generally complies with 
tax laws, taxes are a fairly stable source of revenue absent a large ex-
ogenous shock like a depression.  The property tax, in particular, is a 
fairly stable source of revenue for local governments in most states.50 
Of course, tax monies are not always spent wisely.  One has to ex-
plain why citizens do not spend lavishly on short-term benefits and 
why local officials do not simply line their own pockets.  These ques-
tions are not unique to municipalities, however.  Presumably the ex-
istence of a mature political system and basic electoral accountability 
prevents the worst excesses.  Separation of powers, a judiciary that 
enforces criminal laws against fraud, and an active and independent 
press may also be preconditions for fiscal responsibility. 
That being said, basic checks and balances and “good government” 
do not sufficiently explain the low rates of municipal failures.  Ameri-
can cities grew dramatically between 1880 and 1930—a time when 
 
 46. Gillette, Bondholders, supra note 2, at 647–49. 
 47. See Kordana, supra note 11, at 1058 & n.110. 
 48. See Gillette, Bondholders, supra note 2, at 665–66; Kordana, supra note 11, at 
1099. 
 49. Gillette, Bondholders, supra note 2, at 642–43.  
 50. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 44, at 649–50. 
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municipal governments were often dominated by political machines 
and cities were arguably at their most corrupt.51 Local economic 
health is not impervious to bad government, but it does not seem to 
turn on it.52 Corrupt local officials can preside over periods of robust 
city growth and honest local officials can preside over periods of de-
cline.   
Indeed, the presence of good government institutions does not ex-
plain the industrial cities’ rise, nor does the absence of good govern-
ment institutions explain their decline.  During the second half of the 
twentieth century, many rust belt and older cities have lurched from 
fiscal crisis to fiscal crisis, while other, newer cities have boomed.53  
Deindustrialization, white flight, disinvestment, and concentrated 
poverty have undermined many old-line cities as population has 
moved south and west.54  The process by which this has occurred 
seems to have relatively little to do with the relative fiscal discipline 
of particular cities or the relative effectiveness or ineffectiveness of 
monitoring. 
The paucity of full-scale municipal defaults—at least in the latter 
half of the twentieth century—might instead be attributed to the 
emergence of the federal government as a stabilizing force.  The fed-
eral government serves two roles with respect to sub-federal jurisdic-
tions.  First, the federal government plays an important regulatory 
role, policing the credit markets (at least to some extent) and limiting 
(if not eliminating) corruption.  Second, the federal government has 
taken on the bulk of redistributive spending.  Local governments re-
ceive direct aid from the federal government.  More important is the 
aid that flows to individuals through federal social welfare programs.  
The rise of the social welfare state means that economic downturns 
do not necessarily lead to economic collapse.  The boom and bust cy-
cle is ameliorated by large-scale national social welfare spending.55 
So perhaps municipal borrowing is fairly staid because the likeli-
hood of catastrophic municipal failure is fairly constrained.  Cities oc-
cupy territory, they have the power to tax, they exist within a robust 
 
 51. See Richard C. Schragger, Decentralization and Development, 96 VA. L. REV. 
1837, 1871–72 (2010) (discussing literature on urban corruption and growth).  
 52. See id. at 1871, 1879–81; see also Richard Schragger, Rethinking the Theory 
and Practice of Local Economic Development, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 323–31 (2010). 
 53. For a discussion, see JON C. TEAFORD, THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN 
CITY 141–46, 158–60, 169 (2d ed. 1993). 
 54. See, e.g., DOUGLAS RAE, CITY: URBANISM AND ITS END XIV–XV (2003). 
 55. See generally David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 2544, 2648 (2005).  
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federal system, and the modern social welfare state backstops their 
local economies.  Decline certainly occurs, but it is not often precipi-
tous.  Failures occur when declining tax revenues cannot keep up with 
increased costs.  This mismatch can happen when a particular infra-
structure project goes bad56 or when mismanagement occurs, but it is 
also often a result of the long-term and dramatic restructuring of the 
global economy.57 
This leads to the second—historical—puzzle.  In the nineteenth 
century, state legislatures and state courts were often inclined to ab-
solve localities of debts incurred in the heat of economic booms.  In 
the twenty-first century, however, there appears to be a different 
trend.  Local fiscal distress has more often been treated as a moral 
failure on the part of municipal officials and the public discourse of 
austerity seems to favor bondholders over citizens. 
The assumed sanctity of bondholder commitments requires expla-
nation, especially in light of the political imperatives faced by local 
elected officials, who would presumably favor citizens over bond-
holders.  One possibility is that municipalities fear being shut out of 
the credit markets altogether.  There is also a genuine fear of conta-
gion.  Localities fear that a default will reduce their ability to borrow 
in the future, and state officials are eager to avoid local defaults or 
any whiff of municipal bankruptcy for fear that borrowing costs will 
rise for other localities and for the state as a whole. 
But while there is some evidence that interest rates increase for all 
borrowers in reaction to a default,58 the contagion claim is likely over-
stated.59  First, there is evidence that municipalities are able to access 
 
 56. See Money Up in Smoke: An Incinerator Brings Pennsylvania’s Capital Close 
to Fiscal Ruin, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 29, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/215 
34811; Joe Songer, Alabama County Files for Largest Municipal Bankruptcy, USA 
TODAY (Nov. 9, 2011, 11:26 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/story/20 
11-11-09/alabama-county-bankruptcy/51146416/1. 
 57. See RAE, supra note 54, at 363–67.  
 58. See Tamim Bayoumi et al., Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrow-
ers? Evidence from U.S. States, 27 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 1046, 1047 (1995). 
 59. The contagion literature in the municipal borrowing context is limited and 
somewhat mixed.  Some have found evidence of contagion, others have not.  For a 
summary, see John M. Halstead et al., Orange County Bankruptcy: Financial Conta-
gion in the Municipal Bond and Bank Equity Markets, 39 FIN. REV. 293, 297 (2004).  
Halstead et al. found that municipal bond funds experienced abnormally low returns 
in the eight-day period after the Orange County bankruptcy was announced.  Id. at 
299.  The authors took this as evidence of contagion, at least for the short time period 
immediately surrounding the bankruptcy. Id. at 313; see also MARK BALDASSARE, 
WHEN GOVERNMENT FAILS: THE ORANGE COUNTY BANKRUPTCY 244–46 (1998) (ar-
guing that the Orange County bankruptcy raised borrowing rates for cities through-
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the bond market relatively soon after a default and at reasonable 
rates.60  Indeed, there is evidence more generally that the financial 
markets do not penalize sovereign defaulters very severely at all.61  
Second, the bond market seems to be able to distinguish among mu-
nicipal borrowers, even if crudely.  Despite the recent filing of the 
largest municipal bankruptcy in United States history and recent pre-
dictions that the recession would trigger municipal defaults on a mas-
sive scale, the 10-year borrowing cost for top-rated states and local 
governments is at its lowest in a decade.62  Short of a panic, the bond 
market seems to be able to accommodate and domesticate municipal 
defaults.63 
The concern for moral hazard has also been a common explana-
tion.  Fiscally strapped cities should pay their debts because they need 
to be incentivized to remedy their wayward ways, to feel the conse-
quences of their actions.  But maybe a kind of Victorian morality is at 
 
out California).  Orange County’s fiscal crisis was precipitated by its treasurer’s deci-
sion to invest its funds in the highly unregulated derivatives market, so its lessons 
might have limited applicability to fiscal crises brought about by other events.  On the 
private side, studies have examined whether one firm’s bankruptcy affects other firms 
within the same industry.  Studies have found a negative effect, no effect, or a posi-
tive effect. See Ken Cyree & Philip Tew, Is Bankruptcy Risk Systematic? A Look at 
the Short Selling Data 4–10 (unpublished manuscript) (draft on file with author).  If 
municipalities are in competition with one another for investment dollars, one can 
imagine certain municipalities benefitting from the bankruptcy filing of a competitor 
city. 
 60. William B. English, Understanding the Costs of Sovereign Debt: American 
State Debts in the 1840’s, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 259, 269 (1996); see also Kordana, su-
pra note 11, at 1074–77; Schragger, supra note 7, at 874. 
 61. See Kordana, supra note 11, at 1077. 
 62. See Michael McDonald, Banks Cash in on Whitney’s Muni-Default Scare, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 14, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-
14/default-defying-muni-rally-shows-dimon-departs-from-whitney-as-banks-
buy.html. 
 63. In prior work, Gillette argues that the problem of contagion provides a reason 
to allow bankruptcy courts to order municipalities to raise taxes. See Gillette, Politi-
cal Will, supra note 11, at 48–50.  He has also argued in this colloquium and else-
where that bond markets can monitor effectively and thereby enhance democratic 
accountability. See Gillette, Bondholders, supra note 2, at 665–70; Gillette, Public 
Debt, supra note 22, at 942–43.  The contagion claim seems to be in tension with the 
monitoring claim.  If bond markets are easily susceptible to the financial swings that 
bring good debtors down with bad debtors, then the markets are not providing very 
effective monitoring.  Indeed, if contagion is a dominant problem in bond markets, 
then the relative fiscal discipline of local governments is not going to matter very 
much.  Every local government debtor will be treated as if it were the most recent de-
faulter.  
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work here, more than a concern about moral hazard.64  Remember 
that there is moral hazard on the lenders’ side as well.  Keeping com-
mitments to bondholders may encourage them to over-lend.  If bond-
holders are in a better position to bear risk—as Gillette and Kordana 
both argue—then making them absorb losses rather than forcing citi-
zens to incur costs will better avoid the problem. 
A different (and more likely) explanation for the punitive attitude 
toward municipalities is hostility to public employee unions65 or a 
more general hostility to redistributional spending.  The payment of 
bond interest appears to be a neutral, even unavoidable expenditure.  
But it is not.  The decision by a fiscally strapped locality to pay off 
bondholders—to avoid a default or prioritize creditors in a bankrupt-
cy proceeding—is often a decision to renege on pension commit-
ments or reduce spending on municipal personnel or social services. 
Paul Peterson famously argued that political interest groups at the 
municipal level tend to coalesce around developmental rather than 
redistributional spending.66  It may be that repaying bonds that pri-
marily pay for local infrastructure is more palatable than keeping the 
municipality’s pension commitments or providing social services. It is 
also plausible that bondholders and bond market participants are 
simply more politically influential than public employees and social 
service recipients. 
The political gap between cities and state legislatures also plays an 
obvious role in the current practice of austerity.  In her contribution 
to this Colloquium, Michelle Wilde Anderson criticizes Michigan’s 
punitive emergency manager law, which permits the governor to re-
place officials of fiscally strapped local governments with appointed 
managers.67  Thus far, four cities and three school districts have emer-
gency managers, and three cities (including Detroit) are under con-
 
 64. Cf. James Surowiecki, Living By Default, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 19, 2011, at 
44 (comparing the lack of moral outrage to the strategic bankruptcy of American 
Airlines with the moral outrage in response to strategic defaults by homeowners).   
 65. Charges that public employee unions have contributed to local fiscal distress 
have become commonplace. See, e.g., E.J. McMahon, State Bankruptcy is a Bad 
Idea, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2011.  
 66. See PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 131–49, 182 (1981). 
 67. Michelle Wilde Anderson, Democratic Dissolution: Radical Experimentation 
in State Takeovers of Local Governments, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 577 (2012); see 
also Lyle Kossis, Examining the Conflict Between Municipal Receivership and Local 
Autonomy, 98 VA. L. REV. 26 n.180, 29 n.196 (forthcoming Sept. 2012) (draft on file 
with author).  
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sent agreements with Financial Review Teams.68  Many of these juris-
dictions are predominantly African-American, and likely to vote 
Democratic, and there is little political cost when Republican gover-
nors and legislators take a disciplinary approach to their finances. 
Forcing cities to pay their bondholders is a way of restricting a 
city’s budgetary options.  This explains why cities might favor bank-
ruptcy, which allows them to seek protection from creditors and avoid 
painful cuts in public services,69  or avoid a hostile state takeover.70  
This effort may be resisted by state legislators, who would rather con-
trol local fiscal outcomes through a state appointed receiver.  States, 
unlike localities, may also be more inclined to placate the credit mar-
kets, either because state officials worry about spillover effects or be-
cause bankers exercise more power than do local citizens at the state 
level.71 
It would be surprising if the choice between creditors and citizens 
was not driven by politics.  What is notable is how often governments 
choose creditors.  Cities often make heroic efforts to avoid default, 
cutting services significantly in order to meet their debt service.72  Af-
ter declaring bankruptcy, Orange Country, California continued to 
pay off its general obligation debt.73  In Rhode Island, the bankrupt 
city of Central Falls continues to pay its general obligation debt hold-
ers after the passage of a state law that gives bondholders a lien on 
the city’s tax receipts.74 
Jefferson County—which includes the city of Birmingham—has, 
by contrast, stopped paying its bondholders.75  It has taken advantage 
of the protections provided by the Bankruptcy Code.  A lawyer for 
the County recently stated, “Jefferson County made a very different 
 
 68. See Emergency Manager Information, MICH. DEP’T OF TREAS., http://www.mich 
igan.gov/treasury/0,1607,7-121-1751_51556-201116--,00.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2012). 
See also e-mail from Michelle Wilde Anderson to author (Jan. 27, 2012) (on file with 
author).  
 69. See Dorothy Brown, Fiscal Distress and Politics: The Bankruptcy Filing of 
Bridgeport as a Case Study in Reclaiming Local Sovereignty, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 625, 
635–37 (1995). 
 70. See, e.g., id.; Sabrina Tavernise, Judge Rejects Bankruptcy in Harrisburg, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2011, at A27. 
 71. See Brown, supra note 69, at 631. 
 72. See Kordana, supra note 11, at 1037, 1072. 
 73. Walsh, supra note 45. 
 74. Gillette, Bondholders, supra note 2, at 651; see also Walsh, supra note 45. 
 75. Walsh, supra note 45. 
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decision than Rhode Island did . . . Rhode Island put bondholders 
ahead of its citizens, and Jefferson County is not going to do that.”76 
CONCLUSION 
The choice between citizens and bondholders is not a technocratic 
one.  And, as a descriptive matter, whether courts or legislatures pri-
oritize citizens or creditors will reflect current political alignments.  
That makes sense.  Debt crises throughout the country (and the 
world) are not merely economic crises, they are political ones. 
That being said, it seems exactly right to charge bondholders with 
the cost of a municipal default.  Bondholders are not better monitors 
than citizens, but they are more appropriate risk-bearers. 
Indeed, my contention here is that privileging citizens over credi-
tors will have little effect on local fiscal health ex ante.  The same is 
true of the reverse.  The primary effect of the choice is distributional.  
That is because incentivizing “fiscal discipline” is a distraction.  In 
thinking about mechanisms to prevent future municipal fiscal crises, 
the decision of whom to charge with the cost of default comes too lit-
tle and too late. Cities are not failing because of lack of monitoring. 
We have to look instead at the larger social, economic, technological, 
legal, and political reasons for city decline and fiscal failure. 
 
 76. Id. (quoting a bankruptcy lawyer representing Jefferson County). 
